

Message Text

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TO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

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SUBJECT: CCD CLOSING STATEMENT

DISTO

FOLLOWING IS CLEARED TEXT OF CLOSING CCD STATEMENT.

1. AS WE CONCLUDE OUR 1974 SESSION IT MAY BE USEFUL TO
RECALL SOME IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE
COMMITTEE'S WORK ON ITS TWO PRINCIPAL AREAS OF CONCERN:
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND A NUCLEAR TEST BAN.

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2. IN OUR 1974 SESSION THE JAPANESE DELEGATION ADVANCED
OUR WORK IN CW BY SUBMITTING ITS DRAFT TREATY ON CHEMICAL
WEAPONS, A DOCUMENT WHICH HAS PROVIDED US ALL WITH SUB-
STANCE FOR FURTHER THOUGHT ON RESTRAINTS ON CHEMICAL

WEAPONS AND WHICH IS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE ON THIS SUBJECT. THE FURTHER INFORMATION ON THIS DRAFT SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE BY THE DELEGATION OF JAPAN AND THE COMMENTS ON IT BY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE BEEN OF GREAT INTEREST TO MY GOVERNMENT AND WILL BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED.

3. MANY OF THESE COMMENTS CAME IN THE INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH CHEMICAL EXPERTS HELD IN THIS COMMITTEE BETWEEN JULY 17 AND 22. MY DELEGATION WAS FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY THE

FACT THAT TWENTY-TWO EXPERTS FROM THIRTEEN COUNTRIES ATTENDED THE SESSIONS, AND ALSO BY THE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE AND CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT THEY BROUGHT TO THESE MEETINGS. MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE WILL RECALL THAT THE PRINCIPAL TOPICS DISCUSSED DURING THE FOUR DAYS OF INFORMAL MEETINGS WERE THE QUESTION OF DEFINING CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS, DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF CW LIMITATIONS, FINDING USEFUL CRITERIA FOR DEFINING THE SCOPE OF PROHIBITIONS, AND DEVISING AN EFFECTIVE CW VERIFICATION SYSTEM. WE BELIEVE THESE INFORMAL MEETINGS ADVANCED THE COMMITTEE'S COLLECTIVE TECHNICAL UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OF THESE IMPORTANT ISSUES. PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED POINTS OF VIEW WERE FURTHER REFINED AT THE SESSIONS, SOME NOVEL AND POTENTIALLY PROMISING APPROACHES WERE INTRODUCED, AND, IN SOME AREAS, SUCH AS THE QUESTION OF FINDING SUITABLE MEANS OF EXPRESSING THE SCOPE OF LIMITATIONS, THERE WAS AN ENCOURAGING DEGREE OF SIMILARITY IN THE VIEWS PUT FORWARD BY EXPERTS. MY DELEGATION FEELS THAT THESE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD PROVIDE A BETTER BASIS FOR ALL OUR GOVERNMENTS TO MAKE INFORMED JUDGMENTS ON CW QUESTIONS.

4. THERE IS ANOTHER IMPORTANT VALUE IN HOLDING THESE MEETINGS. IT IS RELATED TO THE VIEW, EXPRESSED FROM TIME TO TIME IN THIS COMMITTEE, THAT THE ONLY SERIOUS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IS THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT POLITICAL WILL. ACCORDING TO THIS VIEW, ONCE THERE EXISTS THE NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL, ALL REMAINING TECHNICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO A SOLUTION WILL QUICKLY DISSOLVE AND AGREEMENT WILL SOON BE REACHED. IMPLICIT IN THIS CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PROBLEM IS THE NOTION THAT TECHNICAL ISSUES DO NOT, AND SHOULD NOT, HAVE A MAJOR INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL JUDGMENTS. MY DELEGATION DOES NOT SHARE THIS VIEW. WHILE THE RESOLUTION OF SOME TYPES OF TECHNICAL ISSUES MAY OBVIOUSLY AMOUNT TO LITTLE MORE THAN FILLING IN THE FINE DETAILS OF AN AGREEMENT WHOSE OUTLINES ARE ALREADY CLEAR, A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF MORE FUNDAMENTAL TECHNICAL PROBLEMS

IS USUALLY A PREREQUISITE TO DETERMINING THAT A PARTICULAR PROPOSAL IS POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE OR TO DEFINE WHAT THE AGREEMENT CONCERNS. THIS IS TRUE IN THE CASE OF POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WHERE EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REMAINS CRITICAL TO A DETERMINATION OF THE SCOPE OF A POSSIBLE CW MEASURE AND TO AN EVALUATION OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY EFFECTS OF AN AGREEMENT. THIS IS WHY MY DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT SERIOUS TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS SUCH AS THOSE WHICH TOOK PLACE AT THE INFORMAL CW MEETINGS MAKE A NECESSARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORK OF

THE COMMITTEE.

5. IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THE PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY OF VERIFYING THE DESTRUCTION OF CW STOCKPILES. THERE ARE TWO ASPECTS TO THIS PROBLEM. THE MORE DIFFICULT ONE IS THE POSSIBLE RETENTION OF UNDECLARED STOCKPILES. THIS SEEMS TO US TO BE THE PRIMARY OBSTACLE IN CONSIDERING AN AGREEMENT WHICH CALLS FOR THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF CW STOCKPILES. THE SECOND ASPECT OF THIS PROBLEM IS TO ENSURE THAT DECLARED STOCKPILES ARE IN FACT DESTROYED. THIS IS AN EASIER PROBLEM TO SOLVE, PROVIDED THERE IS GOOD WILL ON ALL SIDES.

6. WE HAVE NOTED WITH INTEREST THE PROVISION IN THE DRAFT CW CONVENTION SUBMITTED BY THE JAPANESE DELEGATION WHICH ENVISAGES OBSERVATION OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. WE HOPE THAT THE PAPER SUBMITTED BY THE US DELEGATION ON LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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AGENT DESTRUCTION, WHICH SUGGESTS THAT TECHNICAL INSPECTIONS AT THE DISPOSAL SITE COULD HELP TO DETER NON-COMPLIANCE IN THE DESTRUCTION STAGE, WILL BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED BY ALL PARTIES. WE KNOW OF NO WAY TO VERIFY THE DESTRUCTION OF DECLARED STOCKPILES EXCEPT BY THE OBSERVATION OF DESTRUCTION. OBSERVATION OF DESTRUCTION COULD BE CARRIED OUT AT A SITE SELECTED BY THE STATE DESTROYING THE AGENTS WHICH, AS THE US PAPER SUGGESTS, COULD BE WELL REMOVED FROM ANY OTHER MILITARY OR CIVILIAN INSTALLATIONS. DESTRUCTION COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY KNOWN CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL PROCESSES. WE THEREFORE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE PROCEDURES FOR CW DESTRUCTION SO THAT NEITHER INDUSTRIAL NOR MILITARY SECRETS WOULD BE REVEALED.

7. I REALIZE THAT THE PROLONGED AND HARD WORK OF THIS COMMITTEE ON THE QUESTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAS DEMANDED FROM ALL OF US A GREAT DEAL OF DEDICATION AND PERSEVERANCE. IT LIES IN THE NATURE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS THAT THEIR PRODUCTION IS SIMILAR IN MANY RESPECTS

TO NORMAL, PEACEFUL OPERATIONS IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND THAT CW STOCKPILES ARE PARTICULARLY EASY TO CONCEAL. GIVEN THESE ENORMOUS OBSTACLES, IT SEEMS REASONABLE FOR US TO PROCEED WITH OUR DISCUSSIONS OF VERIFIABLE PROHIBITIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY DEALING WITH EACH ASPECT SERIOUSLY AND CONVERGING ON SOLUTIONS OF THOSE ASPECTS FOR WHICH SOLUTIONS CAN MOST READILY BE FOUND. AS I MENTIONED EARLIER, IT IS MUCH EASIER TO ENVISAGE A SOLUTION FOR THE VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION OF DECLARED CW STOCKPILES THAN IT IS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF VERI-

FYING THAT THE DECLARATION OF STOCKPILES IS IN FACT COMPLETE.

8. IN REVIEWING THE EVENTS OF THIS SESSION, I WISH TO REFER AGAIN BRIEFLY TO THE TREATY AND PROTOCOL ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS, CONCLUDED BY THE US AND USSR JULY 3. SINCE THE CONCLUSION OF THIS TREATY, THERE HAS BEEN SOME SPECULATION THAT, BECAUSE IT PROVIDES FOR A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON UNDERLIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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GROUND EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, THE TREATY RECOGNIZES SOME DISTINCTION IN THE TECHNOLOGY FOR WEAPONS TESTS AND EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THIS IS NOT THE CASE. AS SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER POINTED OUT JULY 24 BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE, "IT IS UNREALISTIC TO MAKE A DISTINCTION AT THE EARLY STAGES OF NUCLEAR

DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN PEACEFUL USES AND POTENTIAL MILITARY APPLICATIONS BECAUSE ANY CAPACITY TO PRODUCE AN EXPLOSION HAS OBVIOUS MILITARY APPLICATION, NO MATTER WHAT PURPOSE THE COUNTRY CONCERNED ASSERTS IT IS ATTEMPTING TO SERVE." THE PURPOSE OF THIS SEPARATE BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WOULD BE TO MAKE SURE THAT FURTHER ADVANCES IN WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT OR OTHER MILITARY TESTING IS NOT BEING CARRIED OUT IN THE COURSE OF OR UNDER THE GUISE OF EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE PROCEDURES OF THE PROPOSED PNE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE APPLICABLE TO STATES IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY.

9. THE SECRETARY OF STATE MADE THE STATEMENT I QUOTED TO INDICATE WHY WE TAKE THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SO SERIOUSLY. MY GOVERNMENT HAS UNDERTAKEN A WIDERANGING REVIEW OF THIS PROBLEM. IN THIS REVIEW THE NECESSITY OF VIGOROUS INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO DEFEND AND STRENGTHEN NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WAS PERFECTLY CLEAR. THE CLOSE OF OUR SESSION WILL SHORTLY BE FOLLOWED BY THE SECOND MEETING OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 1975 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE

NPT. IN THAT MEETING, AND IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, WE INTEND TO WORK TO STRENGTHEN NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE NPT. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE OVERWHELMING ENDORSEMENT OF THE NPT BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND THE SUBSEQUENT ADHERENCE TO THE TREATY BY MORE THAN EIGHTY COUNTRIES, REPRESENTS THE COLLECTIVE JUDGMENT THAT IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE ENTIRE WORLD COMMUNITY TO LIMIT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AND TECHNOLOGY. WE THEREFORE EARNESTLY HOPE THAT ALL STATES, PARTICULARLY

THOSE IN THIS COMMITTEE, WILL JOIN US IN WORKING TOWARD THAT GOAL.

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10. LET ME NOW TURN TO THE QUESTION OF MEMBERSHIP IN THIS COMMITTEE. AS WE END OUR 1974 MEETINGS IT GIVES ME GREAT SATISFACTION THAT, AS THE RESULT OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE CO-CHAIRMEN AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, A CONSENSUS HAS BEEN REACHED TO ENLARGE THE COMMITTEE BY THE ADMISSION OF FIVE NEW STATES, THE FRG, GDR, IRAN, PERU, AND ZAIRE. WE BELIEVE THESE NEW MEMBERS WILL MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE, CONTINUING ITS TRADITION OF CAREFUL AND SERIOUS STUDY OF THE COMPLEX ISSUES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. I LOOK FORWARD, AS I AM SURE WE ALL DO, TO WELCOMING OUR NEW COLLEAGUES AT OUR NEXT SESSION. INGERSOLL

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